Freedom to Petition: The Tort Reform Opponent\u27s Untapped Resource by Garcia-Lamarca, Angela W.
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
Volume 2 | Issue 2 Article 6
3-1-2004
Freedom to Petition: The Tort Reform Opponent's
Untapped Resource
Angela W. Garcia-Lamarca
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in First Amendment
Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Angela W. Garcia-Lamarca, Freedom to Petition: The Tort Reform Opponent's Untapped Resource, 2 First Amend. L. Rev. 351 (2004).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr/vol2/iss2/6
Freedom to Petition: The Tort Reform Opponent's
Untapped Resource
Angela W. Garcia-Lamarca*
Last year, high school officials demoted a Minnesota
cheerleader from her position as captain of the cheerleading squad
after she was caught with alcohol and tobacco.' In the resulting suit
against her school, 17-year-old Andrea Warren seeks $50,000 in
retribution for the inflicted punishment, which she claims was too
harsh and may deprive her of college scholarships. 2 Andrea's civil
case is one of fifteen million civil cases processed in the United
States every year.' America has become the most litigious nation in
the world, and our civil justice system the most expensive.'
As a result of these rising costs, tort reform efforts have
emerged at both the federal and state level.' The U.S. Senate is
currently debating whether to pass the Class Action Fairness Act," a
bill that would reform the "out-of-control state class action lawsuit
system.",7 The Act targets frivolous class action lawsuits and abuses
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2005.
1. James Walsh, Cheerleader Sues School over Scope of Her Punishment,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 8, 2002, at lB.
2. Id.
3. Advancing Civil Justice Reform, CIv. JUST. REF. INITIATIVE (Nat'l Ctr.
for State Courts, Willliamsburg, Va.), at 1, http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/
Publications/ResCtCommCJRIPub.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2004) (on file
with the First Amendment Law Review).
4. Wayne T. Brough, Cheering for Tort Reform (Sept. 3, 2003), at
http://www.cse.org/processor/printer.php? issueid=1535 (on file with the First
Amendment Law Review).
5. Id.
6. Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, 149 CONG. REC. S12996-01 (daily
ed. Oct. 22, 2003).
7. Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Urges
Senate Panel to Pass Class Action Reform Bill; Measure Protects Consumers,
Investors, Employees, and Businesses from the Worst Abuses of the Class
Action System (Aug. 2, 2002), http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2002/
august/02-129.htm (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
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in the system, which are costly to businesses and consumers. ' The
Act also proposes reform that would diminish those costs by
allowing complex national class actions to be removed more easily
to federal courts, which have the expertise and resources to better
handle such cases.9
Most tort reform legislation is enacted at the state level, and
several states have already adopted legal reforms.0 For example,
North Carolina is one of thirty-three states that have adopted
punitive damage reform legislation." Passed in 1995, the North
Carolina legislation limits the award of punitive damages in a tort
case to an amount no greater than three times the award of
compensatory damages, or $250,000, whichever is greater.12 It also
raises the evidentiary standard so that, in order to recover punitive
damages, a plaintiff must show by "clear and convincing" evidence
that one of three "aggravating factors" was present." Additionally,
the legislation permits a defendant to request a separate proceeding
for the determination of punitive damages. 4 These legislative
adjustments ostensibly reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits by
making it more difficult to collect punitive damages. States have
adopted a variety of alternative tort reform legislation, including
joint and several liability, the collateral source rule, non-economic
damage, and product liability. 5
8. "Companies spend millions of dollars each year to defend against class
action lawsuits. Even the threat of such suits can lead to significant costs to a
business. And those costs often are passed on to consumers." Action Alert,
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Tell Congress to Make Our Legal System
Simpler, Fairer and Faster, http://www.uschamber.com/capwiz/load.asp?p=/
chamber/issues/alert/?alertid=1838091 (last visited Mar. 31, 2004) (on file with
the First Amendment Law Review).
9. CONG. REC. S12996-01 (statement of Sen. Ensign) ("It is obvious there
is a need to reform our class action system. We need to take it where we have
the best jurists [which is] in the Federal system.").
10. Brough, supra note 4.
11. AM. TORT REFORM Ass'N, TORT REFORM RECORD 2-3 (Dec. 31,
2003), http://www.atra.org/files.cgi/7668_Record12-03.pdf (on file with the
First Amendment Law Review).
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § ID-25 (2003).
13. Id. § 1D-15.
14. Id. § 1D-30.
15. AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, supra note 11, at 4 ("Joint and several
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Although enacting legislation that curbs litigation seems a
reasonable response to concerns about the public cost of increased
litigation and rising damage awards, legislation that restricts a
person's ability to access the court system presents a unique
challenge. Our nation has long considered the freedom to petition
the court for redress of grievances a fundamental element of
prosperous democracy. 6 In Marbury v. Madison,7 Chief Justice
Marshall described access to courts as the "very essence of civil
liberty."''. The Supreme Court, however, has only recognized a
specific right to court access grounded in the First Amendment's
Petition Clause" within the last thirty years.' While the casual
observer may not sympathize with the plight of a disappointed
cheerleader, the Supreme Court has indicated that she has a
fundamental right to file a grievance in court seeking redress for
opportunities lost, both tangible and intangible.
This article discusses the political debate surrounding tort
liability is a theory of recovery that permits the plaintiff to recover damages
from multiple defendants collectively, or from each defendant individually.");
id. at 13 ("The collateral source rule of the common law says that evidence
may not be admitted at trial to show that plaintiffs' losses have been
compensated from other sources, such as plaintiffs' insurance, or worker
compensation."); id. at 29 ("Damages for noneconomic losses are damages for
pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of consortium or companionship,
and other intangible injuries."); id. at 38 ("Product liability law is meant to
compensate persons injured by defective products and to deter manufacturers
from marketing such products.").
16. Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition
Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 557
(1999).
17. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
18. "The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an
injury .... [The] government of the United States has been emphatically
termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to
deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of
a vested legal right." Id. at 163.
19. "Congress shall make no law respecting.., the right of the people ...
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
20. Andrews, supra note 16, at 559 (discussing Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972)).
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reform, and posits that the First Amendment's Petition Clause
provides an untapped resource for bolstering the argument against
tort reform legislation, which would restrict a claimant's access to
the court system. Part I summarizes the primary arguments on
either side of the tort reform debate. Part II defines the scope of
the freedom to petition through its legislative and judicial
evolution. Part III applies the Petition Clause to the tort reform
debate and shows that legislative reforms restricting court access
are unconstitutional.
I. THE TORT REFORM DEBATE
Tort reform has become an important political issue over
the last ten years as liability costs soar, affecting not only the
litigating parties, but also consumers who vicariously subsidize the
rising cost of litigation through escalating insurance premiums.2'
The debate is overwhelmingly partisan, with Republicans
supporting tort reform while Democrats oppose it.22 Both parties
are pressed to resolve the problem because it insidiously affects the
every day lives of individual citizens. For example, when physicians
can no longer afford their medical malpractice insurance
theoretically due to skyrocketing damage awards in tort cases, they
are forced to change specializations or stop practicing medicine
altogether."
Over the last decade, 24 "tort reform" has become a phrase
often invoked, although not singularly defined. Corporations,
politicians, attorneys, and concerned Americans alike are engaged
21. Robert R. Gasaway, The Problem of Tort Reform: Federalism and
the Regulation of Lawyers, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 953, 953 (2002).
22. Philip Shuchman, It Isn't that the Tort Lawyers Are Right, It's Just that
the Tort Reformers Are So Wrong, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 485, 485 n.1 (1997);
John Schmid, Economy Creates New Political World, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Feb. 9, 2004, at Al.
23. Press Release, Am. Tort Reform Ass'n, ATRA to Testify: Medical
Liability Reform Key Solution to Skyrocketing Healthcare Costs (Sept. 30,
2003), http://www.atra.org/show.php?id=7637&print=l (on file with the First
Amendment Law Review).
24. Gasaway, supra note 21, at 953.
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in various contexts and to varying degrees in supporting or
protesting legislative action, which may significantly alter the U.S.
civil justice system. Corporations view tort reform as a way to
control sizable liabilities to which they are exposed, while plaintiff's
attorneys resist tort reform. Political leaders employ the phrase to
inspire hope that legislative action may soon curb the ever-
increasing volume of civil lawsuits and related costs. 26 Attorneys in
a myriad of fields apply "the term as a label for a variety of legal
reforms they would happen to prefer., 27  The problems and
legislative cures vary from state to state.
Opponents of tort reform argue that although costs
associated with litigation are undeniably high and steadily
increasing, the only beneficiaries of damage caps and other tort
reform legislation are corporations and the insurance companies
that insure them.2  To support his assertion that rising damage
awards are not the source of skyrocketing insurance premiums,
Jamie Court, Executive Director of The Foundation for Taxpayer
and Consumer Rights, noted that "the Bush administration's own
national practitioner databank found ten years ago the average
verdict in a medical malpractice case was $400,000 and last year the
average was $450,000. "29
Critics of tort reform argue that legislative restrictions are




28. News Release, Found. for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights, Tort:
Capping Damage Awards and Denying Consumers Their Day in Court (July
13, 1999), http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/justice/pr/pr000066.php3 (on file
with the First Amendment Law Review).
29. Today: Problems with Medical Malpractice Suits (NBC television
broadcast, Aug. 7, 2003), transcript at http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/
healthcare/nw/nw003531.php3 (last visited Mar. 31, 2004) (on file with the
First Amendment Law Review). In his interview with Matt Lauer of the
Today show, Jamie Court went on to say, "There's a lot of myths floating
around here, but the ... fact is there hasn't been a big uptick in malpractice
verdicts. What we've seen is malpractice insurance premiums go up. And
what we need to do to fix that is regulate insurance company's [sic] investment
practices." Id.
20041
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of those who support reform, tort legislation does not produce
lower insurance costs or rates.3 A 1999 report tested the hypothesis
that tort law succeeds in reducing insurance costs for consumers. If
this hypothesis were true, more stringent limits on tort damage
awards would be associated with lower insurance rates.3 The
report concluded:
Despite what 'tort reform' proponents
promised lawmakers, tort law limits enacted
since the liability insurance crisis of the mid-
1980's have not lowered insurance rates in the
ensuing years. States with little or no tort law
restrictions have experienced the same level of
insurance rates as those states that enacted
severe restrictions on victims' rights.
32
Similarly, during his 2000 presidential campaign, Ralph
Nader referred to tort reform as "tort deform. 3 3 Nader argues that
" 'tort deform' laws take away the rights of 99 percent of the people
who live in this country, while letting a handful of corporations
escape accountability for reckless misconduct that causes injury and
death. 3 ' Nader, like others who oppose tort reform, dismisses costs
associated with litigation as secondary to the more significant right
of injured people to pursue recovery through the civil justice
30. Executive Summary, Ctr. for Just. & Democracy, Premium Deceit:
The Failure of "Tort Reform" to Cut Insurance Prices (summarizing the
findings of J. Robert Hunter's and Joanne Doroshow's in-depth study of
insurance rates), at http://www.centerjd.org/lib/premium-deceit.htm (last
visited Mar. 31 2004) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
31. Id.
32. Id. The report, which analyzed data on "insurance rate and loss cost
movement in every state from 1985 through 1998," was one of the most
exhaustive reviews of insurance rate activity to date.
33. Massie Ritsch, Campaign 2000: Nader Slams Rivals for Consumer
Rights Record, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 11. 2004, at A23.
34. Citizen Works, Tort Reform, at http://www.citizenworks.org/
issues/democracy/demo-issuepapers-tortref.php (last visited Mar. 31, 2004)
(on file with the First Amendment Law Review). Citizen Works was founded
by Nader in 2001. Nader cites a report by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and
the National Center for State Courts, which indicates there has been no
"explosion" in the amount of punitive damages awards, as evidence that there




Tort deforms make it difficult or impossible for
American consumers who suffer death, brain
injury, amputation, paralysis, quadriplegia,
cancer and other devastating injuries at the
hands of corporate wrongdoers, to be fully
compensated for their harm.... Tort deform is
nothing more than bailout from liability and
responsibility for corporations, including the
largest and richest corporations in the world at
the expense of all Americans. The tragic costs,
human and economic, are born by the
wrongfully injured and their families, not by
the wrongdoers themselves.35
Tort reformists, on the other hand, suggest that our civil
justice system is currently facing challenges unprecedented in its
36more than two centuries of existence. Supporters of tort reform
identify several factors contributing to the increase in liability costs.
The contributory negligence rule, for example, once limited the
number of injured persons who could claim damages by
disqualifying a negligent victim from recovery as against a negligent
defendant.37 The contributory negligence defense has been almost
entirely abandoned today. Instead, application of a comparative
negligence standard allows recovery where the plaintiff is merely
less at fault than the defendant.
39
Tort reformists argue that another factor contributing to
40increased litigation is the rapid growth in the number of attorneys.
35. Id.
36. Gasaway, supra note 21, at 954.
37. News Batch, Tort Reform, at http://www.newsbatch.com/tort.htm
(last visited Mar. 31, 2004) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
38. George L. Priest, The Culture of Modern Tort Law, 34 VAL. U. L.
REv. 573, 575 (2000). Contributory negligence remains available as a total bar
to recovery only in Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia.
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 588
(10th ed. 2000).
39. SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 38, at 588.
40. News Batch, supra note 37. According to data collected by the U.S.
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Legal specialization and technological advances have also improved
the efficiency with which attorneys process cases.4' Pro-reformers
are troubled by the advertisement of legal services, which was
forbidden prior to 1977.42 In Bates v. State Bar,41 the Supreme Court
authorized attorneys to use paid advertisement to promote their
44
services. Today, phone books and television commercials are
replete with advertisements of various legal services. According to
tort reformists, legal advertising persuades prospective personal
injury litigants to hire an attorney in order to get maximum benefit,
despite evidence that claimants are no more satisfied by the
outcome when they hire counsel than when they do not.4'
The American Tort Reform Association (ATRA)
applauded a recent report on the American "lawsuit industry" for
exposing the industry's big business characteristics." ATRA
President Sherman Joyce argued that, "[t]he alarming numbers
reported.., help strengthen the argument to reform America's civil
justice system. 47 Joyce also reported that 2003 was ATRA's most
successful year since 1995 for reducing costs to the tort system
through enactment of civil justice reforms. 4' Twenty-three states
Census and the American Bar Association between 1980 and 1995, the




43. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
44. Id. at 384.
45. News Batch, supra note 38.
46. Press Release, Am. Tort Reform Ass'n, "Trial Lawyers, Inc."
Exposes the Big Business of the "Lawsuit Industry" (Sept. 23, 2003)
[hereinafter Big Business], http://www.atra.org/show.php?id=7630&print=l
(on file with the First Amendment Law Review); see also James R. Copland,
A Message from the Director for CTR. FOR LEGAL POL'Y, TRIAL LAWYERS,
INC., 2, 2-3 (2003) (indicating that tort costs nationwide exceed $200 billion
annually, which is more than 2% of the U.S. gross domestic product, a higher
percentage than in any other developed country. Even as the economy has
stagnated and the stock market plunged, litigation revenues continue to soar),
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/triallawyersinc.pdf (on file with the First
Amendment Law Review).
47. Big Business, supra note 46.
48. Id.
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enacted new legislation in 2003.'9
Advocates of tort reform argue that the economic burdens
imposed on society by unfettered litigation necessitate restricting
court access. In response, tort reform opponents insist that any
incidental economic burden does not outweigh the moral or ethical
cost of denying an injured party the right to seek redress through
the court. These opponents promote a right to court access without
explaining its constitutional significance. Despite a clear
constitutional mandate for the freedom to petition, tort reform
critics have overlooked the role of this right in the current political
debate. By defining its scope and applying the freedom to petition
to the tort reform debate, opponents of tort reform may find the
necessary weight to tip the balance in their favor.
1I. THE SCOPE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM TO PETITION
The freedom to petition was included in the First
Amendment as its "capstone," having been "at the core of
constitutional law and politics in the early United States."50 "Yet,
judicial decisions construing this guarantee are ... rare and there is
little doctrinal or scholarly exploration of" how such a right may be
defined.5 ' James Madison perceived the First Amendment freedom
to petition as integral to guarding the American people's right to
"communicate their will" to their government. 52 The right of the
people to petition the government for redress of grievances is not
limited merely to stating their views, but also entitles them to seek
relief.5 Though not guaranteed relief, citizens have the right to ask
49. Id.
50. Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and
Significance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2157 (1998).
"Petitioning was the most important form of political speech the colonists had
known, not just because of its expressive character, but also because of the
ways in which it structured politics and the processes of government, even as
separation of powers was becoming a reality." Id.
51. Aviam Soifer, Redress, Progress and the Benchmark Problem, 40 B.C.
L. REV. 525, 525 (1998).
52. Andrews, supra note 16, at 624.
53. Id.
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for it and the right to receive a response, even if only to deny their
claim . 4 This freedom gives citizens a chance to resolve grievances
peacefully and lawfully and instills in people a sense of justice and
order in their government.
55
Before the freedom to petition (which includes both the
right to court access and to government response) can be applied to
the tort reform debate, it is first necessary to define the scope of
that freedom.
A. Legislative History
Due to the paucity of historical or textual justifications for
adopting a narrow or limiting view of the freedom to petition, it is
reasonable to accept a broad definition of it. The provenance of
the freedom to petition in England and the drafting of the First
Amendment both support an interpretation of the right as an
absolute one. In contrast to other freedoms drafted prior to the
American Revolution - including speech, press, and assembly, all of
which were subject to legislative and practical restrictions - the
freedom to petition was considered an absolute right as against the
government of England.
The American colonists transported much of England's
political culture to the colonies and worked to emulate its best
features in their burgeoning settlements.57 Early American colonial
charters provided explicit protection of the freedom to petition, as
evidenced first in the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641. 5
54. Id. Andrews notes that the petition clause itself does not include a
claimant's right to government response. However, filing an initial claim for
relief under the Petition Clause triggers the Due Process Clause which
guarantees a response. Under either analysis, the freedom to petition assures
a claimant the right to file a claim and receive a response.
55. id.
56. Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging...": An Analysis
of the Neglected, But Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV.
1153, 1181 (1986).
57. Mark, supra note 50, at 2174.
58. Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition
Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut From a Different Cloth, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 27-28 (1993).
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Colonial governments regarded petitioning as a fundamental right -
a tangible method through which individuals could participate in
government by voicing their grievances to local governing bodies.
Petitioners enjoyed special protections and were rarely punished
for the subject matter of their petitions, because the right to
criticize the government was understood to be implicit in the
fundamental freedom to petition." Not only did the colonies
explicitly affirm the freedom to petition via their charters, they
expanded it in both law and practice.6
Also inherent in the freedom to petition was the correlative
right to a response. As in England, the right to a response in the
colonies did not include the right to a hearing, nor did it include the
right to a favorable response. Instead, it required at a minimum,
that the governing body formally deny any petition it chose not to
review.63 Despite rising complaints about the slow administration of
justice, colonial courts did not and could not restrict or refuse
access even when petitions became numerous; they simply labored
more quickly to accommodate the increasing number of claims.6
The drafting history of the Petition Clause sheds even more
light on the evolving understanding of the freedom to petition,
which, in turn, reflects the metamorphosis of American government
from its early model of governance by state legislatures to the
"Every man whether Inhabitant or fforreiner, free or not
free shall have libertie to come to any publique Court,
Councel, or Towne meeting, and either by speech or
writeing to move any lawfull, seasonable, and materiall
question, or to present any necessary motion, complaint,
petition, Bill or information, whereof that meeting hath
proper cognizance, so it be done in convenient time, due
order, and respective manner."
Id. (quoting the Massachusetts Body of Liberties).
59. Id. at 28.
60. Id. at 32 (quoting RICHARD L. BUSHMAN, KING AND PEOPLE IN
PROVINCIAL MASSACHUSETTrs 46-47 (1985)).
61. Mark, supra note 50, at 2175.
62. Spanbauer, supra note 58, at 33.
63. Id. at 33-34.
64. Id. at 33.
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current federal model of governance by three discrete branches. ' 5
"The First Congress, and the states that ratified the Petition Clause,
deliberately departed from existing models of the right" as one to
petition only the legislature. 6  The newly codified right included
freedom to petition the entire government: executive, legislature,
and judiciary. This change reflected not just the evolution of the
American government, but a corresponding evolution of political
culture.
The American colonial polity was far more corporate and
hierarchical in its social and political structure than the
individualistic and liberal polity that came to characterize most of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 67 For colonists and citizens
of the young republic, petitioning embodied a central form of
access to the political process.6' Filing a petition was a way to
inform legislators of public and private concerns among their
constituents. As a policy matter, the freedom to petition
encouraged peaceful resolution to individual civil strife and
fostered participation by citizens who viewed their right to petition
as a tool of individual liberty.
As the unmediated, personal politics of America's
beginnings gave way to the mass politics we know today, the
Petition Clause slid into relative obscurity as a means to directly
influence public policy legislation. Once the mainstay of political
65. Andrews, supra note 16, at 611.
66. Id. at 621.
67. See Mark, supra note 50, at 2158.
Colonial society was characterized to a great extent by its
members' conscious and unconscious allegiances to
groups, both formally and informally constituted....
[E]very person, to the extent of membership in a group,
played out political roles, even sub silentio. . . . The
decline of that society, and the concurrent rise of a liberal
polity, gutted petition of its original constitutional and
political meaning and left those persons not directly
included in the liberal enfranchised polity with an even
more tenuous toehold in formal politics than petition had
provided.
Id. at 2158-60.
68. Andrews, supra note 16, at 623.
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participation, the freedom to petition was overshadowed as a
lobbying mechanism by constitutionally-protected speech, press,
and assembly. Despite the changing face of political culture in
America, the freedom to petition remains a vital ingredient of civil
liberty. Though largely overlooked by judges and scholars until
recently, the Petition Clause stands today to protect citizens'
interest in political participation via the judicial process. The
Petition Clause provides broad protection of every person's right to
petition the court for redress for grievances, and it is waiting for a
proper reception and application by those in the legal profession.
B. Judicial History
The Supreme Court first limited the freedom to petition in
its 1961 decision, Eastern Railroad Conference v. Noerr Motor
• 69
Freight, 9 an antitrust dispute between trucking companies and• 70
railroads. The truckers complained that the railroad had acted
solely to " 'injure the truckers and eventually to destroy them as
competitors in persuading the governor of Pennsylvania to veto a
bill that would have benefited truckers."" The Supreme Court
"held that the complaint did not state a cause of action under the
antitrust laws."" Among the policy justifications cited was that the
antitrust laws could not apply to petitioning activity73 because "such
a construction.., would raise important constitutional questions.
The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of
Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress the
intent to invade these freedoms. 7 4 The Court, however, qualified
the freedom to petition by indicating that "[t]here may be situations
in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward
influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is
actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the
69. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
70. Id. at 144; see Smith, supra note 56, at 1184.
71. Andrews, supra note 16, at 580 (citing Noerr, 365 U.S. at 129).
72. Id. at 580 ("It reached this result by reading the Sherman Act more
narrowly than its literal terms.").
73. "Petitioning" was used in this case to describe legislative lobbying.
74. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138.
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business relationships of a competitor and the application of the
Sherman Act would be justified. 7"
In 1972, California Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited
7 6
expanded the Noerr doctrine of immunity from antitrust liability to
apply to adjudication.77 In California Motor Transport, truckers in
California alleged that a competing group of truckers had filed
repetitive claims in both federal and state courts to deliberately
sabotage petitioners' attempts to transfer or register operating
rights. The Ninth Circuit held that the Noerr doctrine was not
applicable because the petitioning activity was not traditional
lobbying of the legislature, but instead adjudicatory claims before
courts and administrative agencies.m  The Supreme Court
ultimately found that the court filings in question were unprotected,
not because they were adjudicative, but because they were a sham.79
The Court offered several explanations for defining the challenged
litigation as a sham.0  One explanation indicated that if the
petitioners had attempted to deprive their competitors of
meaningful access to courts and administrative tribunals by filing
"baseless, repetitive" claims, the litigation would be a sham and
would not be protected by petitioning immunity."
The idea that the Petition Clause protects a right of court
access in civil cases did not catch on immediately, due in some part
to confusion about the Court's ambiguous definition of sham
75. Id. at 144.
76. 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970), affd, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
77. Cal. Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972);
see Andrews, supra note 16, at 582.
78. See Cal. Motor Transp., 432 F.2d at 758-59.
79. The same philosophy governs the approach of citizens or
groups of them to administrative agencies (which are both
creatures of the legislature, and arms of the executive)
and to the courts, the third branch of the Government.
Certainly, the right to petition extends to all departments
of the Government. The right of access to the courts is
indeed but one aspect of the right to petition.
Cal. Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 510.
80. Id. at 512-14.
81. Spanbauer, supra note 58, at 65; see Cal. Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at
[Vol. 2
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litigation. Courts and scholars alike questioned whether the
principle was an "independent constitutional doctrine at all.""
Judge Posner's opinion in Grip-Pak v. Illinois Tool Works'
provides such an example, when he suggests that California Motor
Transport was an antitrust principle rather than a matter of
Constitutional law.P He recognized that the First Amendment
protects some litigation, "but limited the protection to political
82. Andrews, supra note 16, at 584.
83. Id.
84. 694 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1982). In this case, a manufacturer of plastic
rings used to bind beverage cans sued a competitor alleging theft of trade
secrets and other similar claims. Id. at 468. The competitor claimed that the
original suit violated antitrust laws. Id. The court held that even when a
plaintiff's claim has legal and factual merit, it may nonetheless violate antitrust
laws if its purpose is to harass a competitor with the process of litigation. Id. at
473.
85. Id. at 471-72; see Andrews, supra note 16, at 584-85. Judge Posner,
writing for the court, posited:
The holding [in Noerr] was presented as an
interpretation of the Sherman Act rather than of the First
Amendment, but one strongly influenced by the First
Amendment .... Although [the Court in California
Motor Transport] said that "the right of access to the
courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition,"
this statement was used as the fulcrum to lever the
petitioners out of range of the First Amendment by
characterizing the alleged conspiracy as one to prevent
the respondents from exercising their legal rights to
obtain and transfer operating rights.... It takes a rather
free-wheeling imagination to extrapolate from the
California Motor Transport opinion a principle that if
applied across the board would.., make the tort of abuse
of process invalid under the First Amendment; and we
decline to do so-noting, also, that the Court used the
language of abuse of process to describe the kind of
litigation activity that the First Amendment does not
protect. But it is a separate question whether, as a matter
of antitrust principle, the Sherman Act should be
interpreted to forbid using litigation to suppress
competition.
Grip-Pak, 694 F.2d at 471-72 (citations omitted).
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cases. ''
In the year following Grip-Pak, the Supreme Court, in a
labor case, challenged Judge Posner's opinion that California Motor
Transport is exclusively an antitrust principle and that it only1 7
protects political litigation. In Bill Johnson's Restaurants v.
NLRB, an employer sued his picketing employees for printing
allegedly defamatory statements in a leaflet for distribution." The
NLRB enjoined the employer's petition as an unfair labor practice,
finding that the employer filed it solely to retaliate against his
employees' picketing. The Supreme Court conceded that an
employer could subvert the judicial process by exacting such a
retaliatory scheme, but nevertheless overturned the NLRB's
injunction.w The Court held that despite the risk of abuse, other
considerations, including the states' interest in providing remedies
and protecting its citizens from harm, as well as the First
Amendment freedom to petition, outweighed the NLRB's interest
86. Andrews, supra note 16, at 585.
87. Id. at 585-86.
88. 461 U.S. 731 (1983).
89. Id. at 734.
90. See id. at 750 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Court recognized the
risk associated with permitting a powerful employer to file what may be an
entirely retaliatory lawsuit against hourly-wage employees, like the waitresses
picketing Bill Johnson's Restaurants:
[B]y suing an employee who files charges with the Board
or engages in other protected activities, an employer can
place its employees on notice that anyone who engages in
such conduct is subjecting himself to the possibility of a
burdensome lawsuit. Regardless of how unmeritorious
the employer's suit is, the employee will most likely have
to retain counsel and incur substantial legal expenses to
defend against it. Furthermore ... the chilling effect of a
state lawsuit upon an employee's willingness to engage in
protected activity is multiplied where the complaint seeks
damages in addition to injunctive relief. Where, as here,
such a suit is filed against hourly-wage waitresses or other
individuals who lack the backing of a union, the need to
allow the Board to intervene and provide a remedy is at
its greatest.
Id. at 740-41 (citations omitted).
in enjoining the employer's state suit.'
The statutory interpretation in Bill Johnson's Restaurants
was dictated in part by the Petition Clause. 92  The Court
deliberately used First Amendment language to define labor laws
and to describe what "baseless" suits might fall outside the
protection of its holding. ' This recognition of the right of court
access under the Petition Clause is significant for at least two
reasons. First, the Court applied the Petition Clause doctrine
outside the realm of antitrust law.94 "Second, the Court did so in a
private suit by one plaintiff."95 Unlike Noerr and California Motor
Transport, Bill Johnson's Restaurants involved neither a collective
effort to litigate, nor a political issue; rather, it raised a simple
defamation claim as filed by a single petitioner. 96 Thus, Bill
Johnson's Restaurants swung open the door to a universal freedom
to petition for individual claimants.97
The Court has continually bolstered its affirmation that the
Petition Clause independently protects citizens' access to the
judicial system. In Sure-Tan v. NLRB,"' the Court stated that "[t]he
First Amendment right protected in Bill Johnson's Restaurants is
plainly a 'right of access to the courts... for redress of alleged
wrongs.' "'9 In McDonald v. Smith, '( the Court indicated further
91. Andrews, supra note 16, at 586 (citing Bill Johnson's Rests., 461 U.S.
at 741).
92. Id.
93. Bill Johnson's Rests., 461 U.S. at 743 (citations omitted) ("Just as
false statements are not immunized by the First Amendment right to freedom
of speech, baseless litigation is not immunized by the First Amendment right
to petition.").




98. 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
99. Id. at 897. In Sure-Tan, the NLRB found an employer engaged in
unfair labor practice when he reported employees to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) after they attempted to unionize against his
wishes. See id. at 886-88. The Court held the employer's report to INS was
not protected petitioning activity because he "did not invoke the INS
administrative process in order to seek the redress of any wrongs committed
against him." Id. at 897.
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that the Petition Clause protects civil court filings, because "filing a
complaint in court is a form of petitioning activity.""" Most
importantly, the Court in its 1993 decision, Professional Real Estate
Investors v. Columbia Pictures Industries,"2 clarified the "definition
of sham litigation and granted broader Noerr-Pennington
protection than had been [applied by] lower courts.' 3  In
Professional Real Estate Investors, the latest significant assessment
of the right of court access under the Petition Clause, a more
straight-forward standard was established when the Court said:
"We... hold that an objectively reasonable effort to litigate cannot
be sham regardless of subjective intent.""
III. PETITION CLAUSE MEETS TORT REFORM DEBATE
"Professional Real Estate Investors triggered a virtual
explosion" in the number of courts and scholars who recognize a
fundamental right, under the Petition Clause, to access the court
and seek redress for grievances. 105 Most courts and legal observers
agree that Professional Real Estate Investors established the
constitutional standard for applying immunity to court petitions.'0
100. 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
101. Id. at 484 (citing Bill Johnson's Rests. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743
(1983); Cal. Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972));
see Andrews, supra note 16, at 588.
102. 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
103. Id. at 57; see Andrews, supra note 16, at 588.
104. Profl Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 57. In Professional Real
Estate Investors, Columbia Pictures sued Professional Real Estate (PRE),
resort hotel operators for alleged copyright infringement after PRE attempted
to develop a market for selling videodisc players to other hotels for use by
hotel guests who rent videodiscs to watch in their rooms. Id. at 51-52.
Columbia held copyrights to the motion pictures recorded on PRE's
videodiscs. Id. at 52. PRE counterclaimed, alleging Columbia's copyright
action was a sham disguising underlying motivation to monopolize trade in
violation of the Sherman Act. Id. The Court held that Columbia's subjective
intent was irrelevant so long as the claim itself was reasonable. Id. at 57.
105. Carol Rice Andrews, After BE & K: The 'Difficult Constitutional
Question' of Defining the First Amendment Right to Petition Courts, 39 Hous.
L. REV. 1299, 1319 (2003).
106. Id. at 1318-19.
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Subsequently, courts have applied the "objectively reasonable"
standard to cases in various contexts. '°7
In Professional Real Estate Investors, Columbia Pictures
sued Professional Real Estate Investors (PRE), resort hotel
operators, for alleged copyright infringement after PRE rented
movies (to which Columbia held copyrights) to hotel guests.'' 8 PRE
counterclaimed, alleging, among other things, that Columbia's
copyright action was a sham, disguising an underlying motivation to
monopolize trade in violation of the Sherman Act."°9 The United
States Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's ruling that in
order to be considered sham, a claim must be objectively baseless,
such that no reasonable person could realistically expect to secure
favorable relief."' The Court further clarified that the claimant's
subjective intent was irrelevant so long as the claim itself was
reasonable. " '
The Supreme Court in Professional Real Estate Investors set
out a two-part test for identifying sham litigation. 12 First, the
lawsuit must be "objectively baseless," which is to say that no
claimant could reasonably expect success on the merits."' If an
objective claimant could reasonably presume that the suit stands to
win in court, "the suit is immunized under Noerr, and an antitrust
claim premised on the sham exception must fail.""114 A court may
examine the claimant's subjective motivation for filing the suit only
if the challenged litigation is objectively without merit. Under the
107. See, e.g., Cove Rd. Dev. v. W. Cranston Indus. Park Assocs., 674
A.2d 1234, 1235, 1238-39 (R.I. 1996) (applying the Professional Real Estate
Investors objective test to determine whether the defendants losing zoning
suit was protected against liability under state torts of malicious prosecution
and abuse of process).
108. Prof l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 52.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 62.
111. Id. at 65 (finding the claim "objectively reasonable" because any
"reasonable copyright owner in Columbia's position could have believed that
it had some chance of winning an infringement suit against PRE").
112. Andrews, supra note 105, at 1312.
113. Profl Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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second part of the test, the court must focus on "whether the
baseless lawsuit conceals an attempt to interfere directly with the
business relationships of a competitor" by using the court process
itself-rather than the outcome of that process-as "an
anticompetitive weapon.'.
The Court's formula in Professional Real Estate Investors
looks to the objective content of the petition."7 The first prong of
the test prescribes the relevant expectation as that of a reasonable
person, not that of the actual litigant."' Under the second prong of
the test, which is reached only if the claim is objectively without
merit, the Court includes among possible plaintiff motives not only
intent to harm a competitor through the case's outcome, but also
intent to abuse the litigation process itself."9 Nonetheless, so long
as the petition is objectively reasonable, the fact that the plaintiff
may have filed it solely for the purpose of injuring a competitor by
imposing litigation costs is irrelevant.1
2
0
Opponents of tort reform legislation could rely on the
objectively reasonable test and a broad definition of the Petition
Clause to argue that tort reform legislation that restricts access to
the courts is unconstitutional. For example, North Carolina's tort
reform statute limits a petitioner's ability to seek punitive damages
by restricting awards in a tort case to an amount no greater than
three times the award of compensatory damages, or $250,000,
whichever is greater. 121 Where a petitioner is challenged to do so by
the opposing party, she must first show that the petition in a tort
suit is objectively reasonable. 12  If the reasonable litigant could
expect success on the merits of the claim, then the claim is
116. Id. at 60-61 (citations omitted).




121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25 (2003).
122. Prof'l Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S.
49, 60 (1993) (citing the First Amendment "right to petition" and the Court's
holding in Noerr to find that "[iff an objective litigant could conclude that the




objectively reasonable and must be afforded broad protection of-- 121
the Petition Clause. If the claim is not objectively reasonable,
then the claimant must show that the petition was filed in good
faith. 24  Unless the court finds that the petition was not filed in
good faith, the claimant must be afforded broad protection of the
Petition Clause. 1 5 Where a claimant's petition passes this two-part
test, North Carolina's statute, restricting a petitioner's ability to
seek punitive damages, infringes on the tort victim's First
Amendment freedom to seek redress for grievances in court. 2' Not
only is the restriction arbitrary, it is unnecessary because the court
is not constrained under the Petition Clause, or otherwise, to award
damages as sought by the petitioner, but merely to acknowledge the
petition.127  Thus, in any case where the petitioner's claim is
objectively reasonable, this statute, as applied to that petitioner,
violates the Petition Clause.
"[M]uch of the legal system is controlled at the state
level, ' '12' and therefore many arguments in opposition to tort reform
will arise in state courts. In an Illinois case, Best v. Taylor Machine/ " 129
Works, the plaintiff, Vernon Best, "suffered second and third
degree burns over 40% of his body, including his face, torso, arms,
and hands" when the forklift he was operating at work collapsed
123. See id. (citing the First Amendment's Petition Clause and Noerr to
support its holding that objectively reasonable claims must be afforded broad
filing protection).
124. See id. (explaining that where a claim is not objectively reasonable,
the claimant may still show good faith and by doing so successfully trigger
Petition Clause protection).
125. See id. (clarifying that where an objectively unreasonable petition
was filed in good faith, it satisfies the two-part test and shall be afforded full
protection under the Petition Clause).
126. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1. ("Congress shall make no law...
prohibiting... the right of the people... to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."); see Prof l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 56, 60-61
(citing Noerr and the First Amendment to hold that unwarranted restriction
on a claimant's right to file a claim "invade[s]" one's constitutional freedom to
petition).
127. Spanbauer, supra note 58, at 49.
128. Brough, supra note 4.
129. 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997).
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and ignited.3" In his petition against the forklift's manufacturer,
Taylor Machine Works, Best alleged that he had sustained lost
earnings, anticipated diminished future earnings, had incurred past
medical expenses, and expected to incur future medical expenses as
a result of his injuries."' Best also indicated that his injuries were
"severe, disfiguring and permanent," and that he anticipated future
need for "vocational rehabilitation and convalescent care." 32 He
also described a "painful and lengthy experience as a patient in a
hospital burn unit," where he underwent numerous surgeries and
expected to continue suffering "grievous pain and anguish from his
injuries.',
3
As part of Best's petition, he sought "declaratory and
injunctive relief against Public Act 89-7 on the grounds that the Act
[violated] the Illinois state constitution."'34 In particular, Best
argued that the provision of the Act which imposed limitations on
recovery of non-economic damages135 was unconstitutional because
it violated his constitutional "right to a certain remedy.' 36 Under
Article 1, § 12 of the Illinois Constitution, every person shall "find a
certain remedy ... for all injuries.., which he receives to his
person ... [and shall] obtain justice by law, freely, completely, and
promptly.',137 Additionally, though Best did not reference the
Illinois Constitution's petition clause in his claim, it provides for
every person's right to "apply for redress of grievances. 
'3
1
The Court ultimately held that the compensatory damages
cap of §2-1115.1 violated the Illinois constitutional prohibition
against special legislation 
13 and the separation of powers clause.1
4
0





135. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.1 (2003).
136. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1063.
137. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12.
138. ILL. CONsT. art. I, § 5.
139. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 ("The General Assembly shall pass no
special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether
a general law is or can be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial
determination.").
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The Court declined to address the plaintiff's additional argument
that the Act violated his right to apply for a certain remedy.' Best
won, but had the state constitution not protected his freedom to
petition, he might have argued his case under the Petition Clause.
The Illinois law at issue limited a tort victim's recovery of non-
economic damages to $500,000, regardless of the particular facts of142
his case. After satisfying the two-part objectively reasonable test,
Best could have argued that the Illinois statute restricting his ability
to seek more than $500,000 violated his First Amendment freedom
to petition the court.
14
3
Notably, the defendant in Best v. Taylor Machine Works
made the tort reformists' policy argument that the government
interest "in reducing the systemic costs of tort liability is sufficient
to overcome" a petitioner's interest in seeking redress. 44  The
defendant characterized the law as a legitimate reform measure
within the scope of the state legislature's power to shape public
policy, regulate the state's economic health, and change the
common law.14  The Court responded that even where a reduction
of undefined systemic costs may be identified as a state interest, it is
not clear how limiting "noneconomic damages in personal tort
actions may be rationally related to the achievement of that
interest." 146 The Court reasoned that although damages for non-
economic injuries are difficult to assess, it does not follow that such
difficulty is "alleviated by imposing an arbitrary limitation or cap on
all cases without regard to the facts or circumstances" in an147
individual case. Such limitation actually undermines the "goal of
providing consistency and rationality to the civil justice system."'4
140. ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("The legislative, executive and judicial
branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to
another.").
141. See Best, 689 N.E. 2d at 1081.
142. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.1 (2003).
143. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
144. Best, 689 N.E. 2d at 1077.
145. Id. at 1063.
146. Id. at 1080.
147. id. at 1076.
148. Id.
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The Court in Best cited the preamble to the Public Act itself which
states that "it is the public policy of this State that persons injured
through [tortious conduct] be afforded a legal mechanism to seek
compensation for their injuries."'4 The Court goes on to say that
"[tihere is universal agreement that the compensatory goal of tort




The opportunity to resolve grievances fairly and peacefully
and to seek restoration of wholeness reflects the pursuit of justice
that has characterized our legal system from its inception and that
continues to inform its evolution. 15 ' The First Amendment Petition
Clause has played a central role in furthering that pursuit of justice.
From its original penning and function as a tool of political
participation to its current application as a means of individual
access to courts, the Petition Clause has ever provided broad
protection of a person's freedom to petition the government for
redress of grievances. More recently, the Supreme Court has
established the objectively reasonable test to indicate when the
Petition Clause is applicable in the judicial context. 5  Where a
petition to the court is objectively reasonable under the two-part
test set out in Professional Real Estate Investors, the petitioner is
afforded the full protection of the Petition Clause. Because
legislation restricting a tort victim's ability to seek redress in court
will inevitably affect claims that are objectively reasonable, it
follows that any such tort reform legislation that infringes on a
petitioner's freedom to file a claim may be ruled unconstitutional
under the Petition Clause.
CONCLUSION
Our courts have long applied a strict scrutiny standard "to
judge regulation of First Amendment freedoms, including the
freedom to petition."' In the area of tort reform legislation, this
149. Id. at 1076.
150. Id.
151. See Andrews, supra note 16, at 624.
152. Prof'l Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S.
49, 60-61 (1993).
153. Andrews, supra note 16, at 676.
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standard requires courts to examine whether the government has a
compelling state interest in restricting the freedom to petition the
court, and whether the regulation is narrowly drawn to achieve that
goal with minimal infringement on the right. 4 "Unlike other
standards of review, [strict scrutiny] is not deferential to the
government.",155 Justice Rutledge, writing for the Court in 1945,
said about First Amendment freedoms:
[T]he preferred place given in our scheme to
the great, the indispensable democratic
freedoms secured by the First Amendment...
gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction
not permitting dubious intrusions. And it is the
character of the right, not of the limitation,
which determines what standard governs the
choice. 1
6
The First Amendment freedom to petition is a broad right
limited narrowly by the objectively reasonable standard as defined
by the Supreme Court. As such, it will not bow easily to any
legislative reform that impedes a tort victim's ability to access the
court to seek redress for grievances. It is, simultaneously, the most
neglected and the best resource for many tort reform opponents in
their campaign against tort reform legislation.
154. See id. at 677.
155. Id.
156. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (citations omitted).
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